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FIGURING FORESEEABILITY
David G. Owen *
The universe, cosmology suggests, is comprised largely of "dark
matter," invisible stuff ubiquitously binding all things together.1
Lurking deep inside the law of tort, permeating and connecting its
various components, a vital ingredient defines and gives moral
content to the law of negligence, controlling how each element fits
together and, ultimately, whether one person is bound to pay
another for harm. Foreseeability is the dark matter of tort.
I. THE FORESEEABILITY PARADOX
Foreseeability is the great paradox of tort: one of its most vital
moral tethers, yet irretrievably its most elusive. Long recognized as
providing tort, the law of wrongs,2 with principle and boundaries,
foreseeability crucially defines the nature and scope of responsibility
in tort-its internal meaning and proper limits-especially in
negligence. 3 Even harmful action cannot meaningfully be viewed as
* Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
Thanks to Matthew Anderson, William Mills, Karen Miller, and Douglas
Rushton for research and editorial assistance.
1. See, e.g., NASA, Dark Matter: Introduction, http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov
/docs/science/know li/dark matter.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
2. "Tort," from the French for injury or wrong, derives from the Latin
tortus, meaning twisted or crooked. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E.
KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]; see also Peter Birks,
The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 29,
39 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) ("'Wrong' and 'tort', like 'crook' and 'bent', play on
the same metaphor which contrasts to 'right' and 'straight'. Wrong conduct, or,
using the French word, 'tort', is twisted, a metaphor for condemned or
disapproved." (citing THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 932, 1015
(C.T. Onions ed., 1966))). See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007)
(explaining why tort is properly recognized as a law of "wrongs").
3. In 1850, for example, Baron Pollock opined that "no defendant should
be held liable for consequences which no reasonable man would expect to follow
from his conduct." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 48,
at 342 (1941) (citing Greenland v. Chaplin, (1850) 5 Exch. Rep. 243, 155 Eng.
Rep. 104); see also ALAN CALNAN, DuTY AND INTEGRITY IN TORT LAw 62 (2009)
(tracing foreseeability's central role in fault and responsibility to Aristotle and
the law of Rome); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS *21-45 (New York &
Albany, Banks & Bros. 1892) (1887) (outlining principles of tort liability and
discussing the role of foreseeability); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in
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"wrong" if the actor could not possibly have contemplated that the
action might produce the harm. Moreover, because the effects of all
behavior extend forever, 4 "no coherent conception of responsibility
can suppose that a person is responsible for everything that could be
called a consequence of [his or] her actions."' If roughly stated, it is
largely true that "a defendant is responsible for and only for such
harm as he could reasonably have foreseen and prevented."6 And so
foreseeability-of the kind of harm, from the kind of hazard, to the
kind of person an actor fairly ought to contemplate when deciding
whether and how to act-is the seamless, moral thread that helps
define interpersonal obligations, personal wrongdoing, the extent of
responsibility therefor, and it is the "stuff' that binds them all
together.
Yet, while foreseeability may be the fundamental moral glue of
tort, it provides so little decisional guidance that scholars often
revile it for being vague, vacuous, and indeterminate: "[I]n one sense
everything is foreseeable, in another sense nothing."7  The
slipperiness of foreseeability is evident from the myriad cases
turning on its meaning and application. In evaluating conduct,
should a person be held "reasonably" to foresee8 that knocking a
plank into the hold of a ship carrying benzene will generate a spark
that ignites petrol vapor in the hold, causing an explosion and fire
that destroys the ship?9 That clumsily helping a man to board a
moving train will dislodge a package he is carrying, that fireworks
hidden in the package will fall upon the rails and explode, and that
the explosion will topple scales upon a passenger standing at the
other end of the platform "many feet away"? 10 That oil discharged
by a ship onto water will spread some distance and become ignited
when cotton floating on the oil is set on fire by molten metal dropped
Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q.
49 (1991) (tracing history of foreseeability in proximate cause).
4. "In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to
eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the discovery of America and
beyond. 'The fatal trespass done by Eve was cause of all our woe.'" WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971) (adapted
from Paradise Lost (see JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 507, 521 (Alastair Fowler
ed., Longman 2d ed. 1998) (1667))).
5. Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility, 17 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS.
361, 374 (2004).
6. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR", CAUSATION IN THE LAw 255 (2d ed. 1985).
7. Id. at 256-57 (citing PROSSER, supra note 4, § 43, at 267); see also DAVID
G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 13.5, at 890 (2d ed. 2008) (observing that
"the innate vagueness of 'foreseeability'" renders it "virtually meaningless as a
device for determining the scope of liability in actual cases").
8. Modifying foreseeability with "reason" injects the concept with
flexibility and objective fairness. See infra Part II.C.
9. See In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (U.K.)
(holding that the unforeseeability of the risk did not bar recovery).
10. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding,
4-3, that the unforeseeability of the risk barred recovery).
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by workers on a wharf, destroying the wharf?" That a young man
will tilt and shake a soft-drink vending machine, causing it to fall
upon and kill him, in an effort to steal a Coke? 12 That children will
play with a gas can without a childproof top?1 3 That an assailant
will use the four walls of an unlocked building to conceal an
assault?"4 That a person will attempt suicide by closing herself in a
car trunk without an inside release latch, change her mind, and be
trapped inside for nine days? 5 Or that terrorists will use fertilizer' 6
or an airplane' 7 to blow up the World Trade Center? As a test of
responsibility for consequences in cases such as these, foreseeability
may seem almost empty of content, so devoid of substantive
meaning as to mock the concept of a rule, principle, or standard for
evaluating conduct or its consequences to determine responsibility
in tort. "Law" must be grounded in concepts on firmer footings than
foreseeability, some argue,' 8 or vanish in a vapor like Hamlet's
11. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The
Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.) (U.K.)
(holding that the unforeseeability of the risk barred recovery).
12. See Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, 621 So. 2d 953, 959
(Ala. 1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that evidence existed indicating that the risk was foreseeable); id. at
961 (Ingram, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that there was sufficient evidence that the risk was actually foreseen);
Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition Corp., 111 N.C. App. 520, 432 S.E.2d 915 (1993)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence that the risk was actually foreseen).
13. Compare Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 527 A.2d 1337 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1987) (holding that the risk was unforeseeable as a matter of law
where the label on the can warned against storing it in living areas), with
Keller v. Welles Dep't Store of Racine, 276 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that it was foreseeable that "incurably curious" children might taste
gasoline stored in a can on the floor, or, while playing "mow the lawn" or "gas
station," might pour gasoline from the can).
14. Compare Sanford v. City of Detroit, 371 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that the owner of a vacant building should have known that
criminals might put the building to harmful use), with Roberts v. Pinkins, 430
N.W.2d 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the use of a vacant building for
a criminal assault was unforeseeable).
15. See Daniell v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.M. 1984) (holding
that the unforeseeability of the risk barred recovery).
16. See Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding,
under both New Jersey and New York law, that manufacturers of fertilizer
products could not reasonably foresee that their products would be used in the
1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack).
17. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding, under Virginia law, that the manufacturer of an airliner might
reasonably foresee that failure to design a secure cockpit could facilitate
hijacking that would increase risk to persons and property on the ground in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks).
18. "With affection and respect" does not describe how most scholars view
foreseeability. For a small sampling of criticisms, see, for example, Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1523
(1993) (decrying judicial use of words like "foreseeable, unforeseeable,. . . and
whatever other magic mumbo jumbo courts could use to obfuscate the policies
2009] 1279
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father when the morning cock doth crow."
Notwithstanding its elusive nature, foreseeability so deeply
permeates tort, especially negligence, that it cannot and should not
be excised. For a person's actions to be wrongful, the person must
have had a choice between alternative courses of action and also
must have chosen, by some standard, incorrectly. If an actor
chooses to act in a manner that violates some community norm of
proper behavior, tort law holds the actor accountable for harmful
consequences that result from that choice. Thus, tort responsibility
normally implies that the actor ought to have considered and chosen
to avoid the kind of harm he caused-that he or she wrongfully
failed to avoid the harm. So, ascribing moral character (blame or
praise) to a choice to risk or avoid the risk of harm implies the
actor's ability to conceive ("foresee") its consequences.
Foreseeability thus is bound up, inextricably, in notions of both
wrongfulness and how far responsibility for wrongfulness should
extend.
Between the two views of foreseeability-as essential moral
glue or indeterminate nuisance-the Restatement (Third) of Torts
leans uncomfortably toward the latter point of view. While the
Restatement (Third) forthrightly embraces foreseeability in its
definition of negligence,2 ° it seeks to reduce the role of foreseeability
in proximate cause, renamed "scope of the risk."21 In addition, the
new Restatement unblushingly ousts foreseeability from its
prominent role in duty, boldly casting it out from its vital
gatekeeping role at the front of negligence law into the capricious
wilderness of the other elements.22
How foreseeability should be figured in tort, and whether the
Restatement (Third) has refigured it properly, is the subject of this
Article. The inquiry first examines why, normatively, foreseeability
reaches so deeply into tort, and it then explores, doctrinally, where
foreseeability fits in the elements of the law of negligence. The
overarching question here is whether the role foreseeability plays in
negligence law is correct as presently conceived, or whether instead
that were really at the heart of their decisions"); Patrick J. Kelley, Restating
Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and
the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1039, 1046 (2001) (arguing that foreseeability
is "so open-ended [that it] can be used to explain any decision, even decisions
directly opposed to each other"); Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many Faces of
Foreseeability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 156, 156 (2000) ("Foreseeability is
undoubtedly a muddle in the law of negligence.").
19. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 2.
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: LAB. FOR PHYsICAL HARM § 29 &
cmts. d-e, j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also discussion infra Part
III.B.
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 & cmt.j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
1280 [Vol. 44
HeinOnline  -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1280 2009
FIGURING FORESEEABILITY
foreseeability's role in negligence should be refigured, as the draft
Restatement (Third) wants to do. In contrast to the Restatement
(Third)'s view of foreseeability as a nuisance concept that should be
marginalized, this Article argues that foreseeability's intrinsic moral
power accords it a more prominent place in the pantheon of tort-
indeed, on the lofty perch where it presently resides. Unlike the
Restatement (Third), I come to praise foreseeability, not to bury it.
II. FORESEEABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
Tort law, including negligence, concerns reparative
responsibility for the harmful consequences of wrongdoing. 23
Providing a broad, formal, concrete frame of private accountability
for harm in an unruly world,24 tort law rests on and reflects moral
standards of interpersonal behavior and responsibility for causing
harm to others. 2  And the root concept of tort, of course, is that
actors are held to account for harm, and only such harm, as results
from their wrongful conduct. 6
A. Capacity and Choice
In distinguishing conduct that is wrongful from conduct that is
not, it is helpful first to focus on an agent's ability or "capacity" to
avoid causing harm,27 since one cannot ordinarily be blamed for
failing to do what one cannot do. This follows from Immanuel
Kant's proposition that human dignity is grounded in autonomy, or
self-control, premised on freedom of will as distinguished from
determinism. 28  Because humans are autonomous beings, able to
make choices concerning alternative goals, values, and modes of
behavior, and capable of contemplating the "causal regularities" of
21that behavior, society fairly may judge the quality of a person's
choices that result in harm (or benefit) to other persons. Thus, law
and morals normally figure responsibility for causing harm to
another by evaluating the actor's choices to act in a harmful way
rather than in another, harmless way in view of the intended, likely,
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. See Bernard Williams, Afterword: What Has Philosophy to Learn from
Tort Law?, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 2, at 487.
25. In this Article, I postulate that tort law is grounded in principles of
moral responsibility, though, like Tony Honor6, I have no interest here in
engaging "the largely sterile controversy between positivism and natural law."
See TONY HONORJ , RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 8 (1999).
26. While many agree, Ernest Weinrib has explained this point with
singular clarity and force. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
145-70(1995).
27. The following discussion draws from David G. Owen, Figuring
Responsibility and Fault, 13 KC.L.R. 227, 228 (2002) (U.K.) (book review).
28. See David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in
PHILoSoPHiCAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 2, at 201, 202-03 & n.9.
29. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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and foreseeable consequences of those actions to other persons."
Aptly, an actor whose choices were wrongful in relation to the victim
might be said to "own" the harmful consequences of that
wrongdoing.3 '
For responsibility and blame appropriately to attach to a person
for a harmful action (or credit for a beneficial action), therefore, a
free-will perspective suggests that we first must determine the
actor's ability to understand that the action might be harmful, that
an alternative action might be less harmful, and that the less
harmful alternative was more consistent with the actor's obligations
to other persons in the community. Responsibility for one's actions,
and fault, thus depend upon an actor's capacity to understand, at
the time of contemplated action, his or her relevant options for
action (and inaction), the causal possibilities of those actions, and
reasons why the various actions might be right or wrong. Capacity,
therefore, lexically precedes choice, and choice between actions with
differing outcomes-intended, expected, and foreseeable-prefigures
the idea of fault.
Once an actor's capacity is established, the next step in
determining moral responsibility is to evaluate the propriety of the
actor's choice-the decision to act one way (involving a risk that
eventuates into plaintiffs harm) rather than another way (without
this risk). Choices are fundamental to personhood: in combination,
as the expression of a person's will, they are that person.32 People's
choices define who they are in relation to others in a world crowded
with persons of equal abstract worth chasing limited resources,
including time and space. How choices should be evaluated as right
or wrong is crucially important,33 yet it suffices here to observe that
a person's choice to act in a manner that results in harm cannot
meaningfully be blamed unless the person prior to acting
understood, or possessed at least an abstract capacity to
understand, the consequences of the contemplated action-the
possibility it might cause the kind of harm that actually results.
This is why foreseeability is a key ingredient of responsibility.
30. This might be seen as a Kantian, "reciprocity" conception of
responsibility that links doers and sufferers of harm. See Ripstein, supra note
5, at 362 ("The reciprocity conception views responsibility as a relation between
persons with respect to expected consequences.").
31. See, e.g., id. at 372 (explaining that the reciprocity conception of
responsibility holds that "a consequence belongs to a particular person as
against some other because of the norms governing the interaction of separate
persons pursuing their distinct ends"). Though an "ownership" label is
conclusory, it conveys the responsibility conclusion in a powerfully intuitive
way.
32. See JoHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 337-41 (1980)
(examining views of Thomas Aquinas and others on the relation of decisions to
act and human will).
33. Many have offered thoughts on this most important topic. Mine are set
forth in Owen, supra note 28.
1282 [Vol. 44
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B. Responsibility for Consequences
If choice is so important, one might ask, then why not ground
responsibility simply on the choice to act-knowing, as we all do,
that unexpected and even unforeseeable results, if uncommon, not
infrequently do occur. The argument here might be that
unforeseeable consequences, those types of consequences that people
comprehend as lying outside the realm of normal expectation but
that sometimes do occur, are then actually themselves foreseeable, at
least in a sense. And, since actors contemplate (at some level of
abstract understanding) the possibility of such unexpected results,
may not such consequences fairly be viewed as a product of the
actor's will? One may reach this wider view of responsibility more
directly, however, by simply broadening the notion of responsibility
to include unforeseeable results. Why not, in other words, simply
reject fault as the organizing principle of tort responsibility and
substitute some notion of "strict" liability-a liability principle that
would hold people accountable, without limitation, for all harm
caused by their behavior?
While most sentient beings on the planet today properly insist
on keeping tort law grounded significantly in fault, a number of
commentators have propounded various theories of strict liability
from time to time." One of the most intriguing strict-liability
theories in recent decades is the idea of "outcome responsibility,"
championed most prominently by Tony HonorS.35 This broad theory
of responsibility argues that persons are responsible for all
consequences of their conduct because their identity as persons
"autobiographically" embraces all outcomes of their actions (and
interactions) in the world.36  Since its initial promulgation by
Professors Honor6 and H.L.A. Hart in 1985 and fuller explication by
Honor6 in his Blackstone lecture in 1988, 7 the outcome-
responsibility conception of personal responsibility has beguiled tort
theorists around the globe.
34. An early, prominent strict-liability conception in modem tort theory
was offered by Richard A. Epstein. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); see also Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and
Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STuD. 165 (1974).
For critiques of Epstein's strict-liability theory, see, for example, WEINRIB,
supra note 26, at 171-77; Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict
Liability, 1 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 147 (1988).
35. The following discussion draws from Owen, supra note 27, at 230-34.
36. See HART & HONORt, supra note 6, at lxxx-lxxxi. It should be noted
that the statement of outcome responsibility in the preface (dated 1983) to the
revision of this extraordinary work (published 1985) appears to stand
independently of the extended and sensitive treatments of foreseeability and
remoteness in the volume.
37. This lecture was published as Tony Honord, Responsibility and Luck:
The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 L.Q.R. 530 (1988) (U.K.), and reprinted
in HONOR , supra note 25, at 14.
38. Among considerable other commentary, see, for example, W. Jonathan
2009] 1283
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In the theory's initial iteration, outcome responsibility was
sketched out as a theory of strict responsibility for harm-by merely
causing harm to another, an actor becomes fundamentally linked to
the victim's misfortune and so is "responsible" for the harm:
The idea that individuals are primarily responsible for the
harm which their actions [cause] is important ... to... the
individual's sense of himself as a separate person whose
character is manifested in such actions. Individuals come to
understand themselves as distinct persons, to whatever extent
they do, and to acquire a sense of self-respect largely by
reflection on those changes in the world about them which
their actions ... bring about .... "
This is the essential, existential conception of outcome
responsibility as later and more fully propounded by Honor6: people
are responsible for the effects their actions have on others because
their identity is shaped by how their conduct alters the world. This
is true, he argues, regardless of whether such changes are good or
bad, or whether they are intended, unintended, or even
unforeseeable. Not only does outcome responsibility help define the
"character" of individual persons, but it provides a connective thread
between autonomous beings in the community in which they live.4°
At a minimum, therefore, outcome responsibility is an important
theory about the nature of human identity and relationships. The
important question to tort is whether it is anything more.4 '
One scholar especially sympathetic to Honor6's broad vision of
responsibility is John Gardner.42 Characterizing the theory as "the
Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 941-54 (2005);
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IowA L. REV. 449,
489-96, 503-07 (1992); Ripstein, supra note 5, at 376.
39. HART & HONORIe, supra note 6, at lxxx.
40. See, e.g., id. at lxxx-lxxxi; Honor6, supra note 37, at 543-45, 552-53.
41. Honord himself queries whether outcome responsibility by itself
contains sufficient normative power to support tort responsibility for causing
harm:
Yet outcome-responsibility for harm to another does not by itself
create a duty to compensate. The form that our responsibility for an
outcome should take remains an open question. An apology or
telephone call will often be enough. But outcome-responsibility is a
basis on which the law can erect a duty to compensate if there is
reason to do so.
Tony Honord, The Morality of Tort Law-Questions and Answers, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 2, at 73, 82, reprinted in
HONOR2, supra note 25, at 67, 77-78. Compare, however, his later, more
confident assertion (harking back to the spirit of Honor6, supra note 37) that
strict legal responsibility is sometimes morally justifiable "since we are
responsible for what we do, including what we do without intending to, or
without foreseeing the consequences." HONORk, supra note 25, at 9.
42. See John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in
RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY 111 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001).
1284 [Vol. 44
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most important modern attempt to rehabilitate [a] contrarian
interpretation of the tort of negligence at common law,"43 Gardner
argues that "in spite of the tort's misleading name, the moral
essence of D's tort in a negligence case is really just that he injured
P."" Gardner asserts that the moral (or premoral) grounding of
outcome responsibility in human identity explains the theory's
inherent power:
A regime of strict liability represents the starkest possible
reaffirmation of our agency and its importance in the world,
because the simple idea at the heart of strict liability-the idea
of outcome responsibility-is the idea that we leave traces of
ourselves forever imprinted on history, in the form of the
countless welcome and unwelcome events that were (as
Honord puts it elsewhere) "unequivocally our doing.".. . For
first and foremost, the deeger argument goes, we are what we
do-complete with results.
While Gardner argues cogently for outcome responsibility as a
broad form of moral accountability for harm, other scholars reason
that the case for applying strict outcome responsibility to tort
liability ultimately fails. Stephen Perry has extensively examined
various permutations of outcome responsibility in a corpus of
important work on responsibility in tort law.46 Perry concludes that
a social conception of outcome responsibility, based on a "risk" (I
would say "benefit") principle (that it is fair to require individuals to
accept the costs as well as benefits of their actions), pushes
responsibility toward strict liability,47 the logic of which he
powerfully refutes.48  Arthur Ripstein observes that Honor6's
conception of outcome responsibility for harm is broader and less
coherent than tort liability for harm based on fault.49  While
Ripstein explains that tort law could draw upon distributive justice
to corral the otherwise sweeping notion of outcome responsibility as
requiring merely causation, he observes that a liability regime so
constructed would look entirely different from the tort-law system
43. Id. at 126.
44. Id. at 125.
45. Id. at 133-34. Honord further explains:
[Olur responsibility for what we do and for its outcome is inseparable
from our status as persons. We are the people we are and have the
character we have largely because the dealings in which our bodies
and brains are involved, if in some aspect intentional, are attributed
to us as the actions of persons with a continuing identity.
HONORt, supra note 25, at 10.
46. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Honorg on Responsibility for Outcomes, in
RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 42, at 61; Perry, supra note 38.
47. See Perry, supra note 46, at 61-70; Perry, supra note 38, at 489-96.
48. See Perry, supra note 34.
49. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Law and Private Narratives, in RELATING
TO RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 42, at 37, 42-50.
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presently in place, which grounds responsibility for harm in fault. 50
Peter Cane" and many other commentators 52 agree that more than
causation should be demanded to establish responsibility for harm
and that accountability in tort normally and properly insists on
more directly connecting the actor's will to the victim's harm.
The inability of many of the best minds to understand how
strict liability (under the guise of "outcome responsibility") is
morally justifiable as a theory of reparative responsibility for harm
reflects the ineluctable power of tort law's grounding of liability in
fault. As seen above, blame makes sense only for making wrong
decisions-choices to advance one's own interests in denial of the
equal respect owed to the interests of others. 53 And decisions may
be considered faulty, as argued earlier, only if the actor is capable of
understanding the meaning of those choices-the possible
consequences of contemplated actions. All decisions, that is, involve
choice, choice presumes capacity, and capacity includes
foreseeability as a proxy for the actor's will. In short, a person is not
meaningfully "accountable" for causing harm that he or she cannot
reasonably foresee and therefore in no sense wills. 54 So, if tort law
properly rests on moral fault, as I believe it largely does,
5
foreseeability is a crucial moral cog for responsibility in tort.
C. Why Foreseeable and Not Foreseen?
If the moral value of foreseeability to tort lies in its tying
human will through choice to the consequences of behavior, then we
must ask why tort law views foreseeability in terms of what an actor
50. See id. at 48-50.
51. See, e.g., PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 133-34
(2002); Peter Cane, Responsibility and Fault: A Relational and Functional
Approach to Responsibility, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 42, at
81.
52. See, e.g., Allan Beever, Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in
Tort Law, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 475, 486 (2008) (closely examining
Honor6's outcome-responsibility theory and characterizing it as "odd" and
"bizarre"); Owen, supra note 27, at 231-33 (exploring weaknesses in outcome
responsibility as an independent justification for legal responsibility).
53. See Owen, supra note 28, at 228 ("Choosing to deny another person's
equal right to freedom is the most fundamental reason for [according] blame.");
Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 2, at 249, 249 ("[Under]
the Kantian-Aristotelian theory of legal responsibility, based on the
foundational norm of equal individual freedom,.., the common good to which
law and politics should be directed is. .. the creation of conditions that allow
each person to realize his or her humanity as a self-legislating free rational
being.").
54. As Arthur Ripstein concludes, "norms link agents with consequences,"
and "[floreseeability is relevant to the possibility of norms, because no norm can
require a person to take account of something unforeseeable." Ripstein, supra
note 5, at 377.
55. See supra note 25.
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reasonably should foresee rather than what the person actually does
foresee. One might worry, that is, that holding an actor accountable
for a consequence he or she did not foresee, even though a
reasonable person would have foreseen it, is to hold the actor to an
unfair, strict level of accountability for which he or she is no more
responsible than the victim. This is an important concern.
At bottom, why negligence law holds actors responsible for
foreseeable harm, rather than limiting responsibility to harms they
actually foresaw at the time of acting, is part of the broader inquiry
of why negligence is based on an objective rather than subjective
footing.56  Partial justification for grounding negligence
responsibility in an objective standard lies in the fact that tort law,
unlike moral theory, necessarily operates in an imperfect world
where truth is perceived but dimly and where proof of truth in
courtrooms is even further removed from its Platonic ideal. This
perspective, which we might label a real-world, "rough-justice"
explanation, was applied long ago in Vaughan v. Menlove,57 where
the dim-witted defendant built a combustible hayrick at the
boundary of his land near his neighbor's cottages, which burned
down when the rick ignited. Rather than allowing the defendant to
be judged according to whether he "acted honestly and bond fide to
the best of his own judgment," the court explained that a practicable
legal rule required evaluating the conduct of all persons by a
uniform standard of prudence. 5 If the law chooses to place the
human will at the center of its theory of responsibility, in other
words, the law simply has to accept the fact that the translation of
moral to legal reality is somewhat rough, to say the least.59 Rough
56. Many commentators have addressed this important, broader topic,
which is only sketched out here to provide a backdrop for examining
foreseeability's proper role in negligence law.
57. (1837) 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.).
58. Id. at 474-76, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493. The court stated:
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence
should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which
would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we
ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard
to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.
Id. at 475, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493. Consider also Holmes's colorful explanation:
If... a man is born hasty and awkward, is always.., hurting himself
or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in
the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his
neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors
accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their
standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his
personal equation into account.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 108 (Boston, Little, Brown, &
Co. 1881).
59. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2 (explaining that tort
law, though properly viewed as a law of wrongs, need not perfectly match
wrongdoing with responsibility for redress). Yet Ernest Weinrib argues
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tort justice, one might well conclude, is better than none at all. °
To this rough-justice practicability pole, we may attach a more
satisfying, moral explanation why a person fairly may be held
responsible for harmful consequences that he or she does not foresee
but that prudent people would. As previously discussed, all persons
understand, at some level, that consequences outside the realm of
their expectations sometimes do occur, and so at some level of
abstract understanding they "foresee" the possibility of such
unexpected results. This explanation is rooted in the common
security pact we all implicitly embrace and, hence, in the common
will. Foreseeability's source in the contemplations of a reasonable
prudent person, the objective fountainhead of responsibility,
suggests that foreseeability may be morally grounded in our shared
acceptance of a behavioral norm of a reflective, cautious person.
Most persons acting in the crowded, hurly-burly world, if they
stopped to think about it, probably would accept that responsibility
for the consequences of their actions fairly might be judged
according to the standards of extra care, prudence, and respect for
the interests of others that they would want others to apply to them.
What this kind of Kantian reciprocity means to responsibility for
foreseeable, but not foreseen, harm is that we understand that we
all must surrender a bit of personal will-to-consequence equivalence
if we choose on any particular occasion not to act with utmost care,
prudence, and deliberation upon the variety of harmful
consequences our contemplated action might produce. On the many
occasions when the exigencies of practicable decision making and
action in a busy world lead us to put aside robustly prudent
deliberation and behavior, we opt, as in a lottery,61 to take our
powerfully that the connection between private law and moral theory is elegant
and pure. See WEINRIB, supra note 26, at 20 ("Private law makes corrective
justice and Kantian right explicit by actualizing them in doctrines, concepts,
and institutions that coherently fit together.").
60. For an early inquiry into "rough justice" at work in tort, see Clarence
Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730 (1930). See
generally Williams, supra note 24 (discussing lessons that philosophy can learn
from the practical experience and concrete struggles of tort law).
61. See Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 2, at 387, 401-05
(justifying liability for unexpected consequences in tort in terms of a lottery).
The lottery concept invites comparison to Tony Honord's characterization of
choice as a kind of bet. See Honor6, supra note 37, at 539 ("[Wlhen we reach a
decision to do X rather than Y... we are choosing to put our money on X and
its outcome rather than Y and its outcome."). See also the tangle of related
problems surrounding "moral luck," which has captured the minds of academics
at least since B.A.O. Williams, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 115 (1976) (U.KI), reprinted in BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20 (1981), and T. Nagel,
Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 137 (1976)
(U.K.), reprinted in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979). More
recently, see, for example, Symposium, Moral and Legal Luck, 9 THEORETICAL
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chances on and accept the foreseeable consequences of such
shortcuts, unforeseen though they may be. In such situations,
where we act according to our own practicable moral compass, yet
contrary to higher moral norms, we might well be fairly deemed to
consent to take responsibility for the harmful consequences we
"negligently" cause-those consequences that lie outside the scope of
risks we actually contemplate but that remain inside the realm of
risks we should have contemplated had we acted with the full
prudence and solicitude toward others demanded by their equal
worth.
A reciprocal-waiver explanation along these lines, grounded in
the common will and in the correlative relationship between doers
and sufferers of harm under corrective justice,62 may help justify an
objective standard of responsibility in tort that stretches beyond
foreseen consequences to include those that are merely foreseeable.
If indirectly and unconsciously, members of a community thus may
be seen to accept responsibility for unforeseen risks that remain
inside the broader reasonable-foreseeability bubble that we
understand fairly circumscribes the consequences of our actions. So,
when such risks do eventuate in harm, it is fair, morally, to hold an
actor accountable in tort.
However imperfectly,63 then, tort law translates the moral
predicate of responsibility grounded in the human will and human
choice into a legal one through the concept of foreseeability-the
capacity of a reasonable prudent person to contemplate that acting
in a certain way may produce the type of hazard that actually does
result.64 While translating an actor's actual, subjective capacity into
INQUIRIES L. 1 (2008) (Isr.) (containing articles by Elizabeth Anderson, Tom
Baker, Meir Dan-Cohen, David Enoch, Richard A. Epstein, Daniel Markovits,
Menachem Mautner, Arthur Ripstein, Yoram Shachar, Jeremy Waldron, and
Benjamin C. Zipursky); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2; Gregory C. Keating,
Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHIcS & SOC. PHIL., Aug.
2006, http://www.jesp.org/PDF/StrictLiability-FinalVersion.pdf.
62. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 26, at 145 (positing that "negligence law
unifies doing and suffering"); id. at 203 (stating that "the theoretical case for
basing tort liability on the causation of harm without fault is inconsistent with
the equality and correlativity of corrective justice and with the concept of
agency that underlies Kantian right"); Beever, supra note 52, at 491-93. While
this Article rests on principles of corrective justice, the many dimensions of that
important concept extend far beyond this Article's scope. See generally JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 197-440 (1992) (developing a theory of tort law
that relies on the principle of corrective justice).
63. While one might argue that this discrepancy between legal and moral
theory reveals a lack of cohesion between tort law and morals, I believe instead
that this minor discrepancy merely reflects the administrative frailties of a real-
world tort-law system that tries its best to mirror the ideals of moral
responsibility. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 26, at 147-52; Owen, supra note 28;
Ripstein, supra note 5, at 373-77. Stephen Perry may explain it best:
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the objective capacity of a reasonable person requires pounding out
some imperfections in the alignment of tort and moral notions of
responsibility, the fit is usually close enough to accomplish rough
justice in an imperfect world.
III. FORESEEABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
Now that we have examined why negligence law is normatively
bounded by the concept of foreseeability, we may turn to a
consideration of where in negligence-in which elements-
foreseeability properly belongs. Among the five elements of which
negligence is comprised,6 most scholars agree that foreseeability is
implicated significantly in three: duty, breach, and proximate
cause.66 Breach and proximate cause may be the most important,
and, because the role of foreseeability in them is least controversial,
how foreseeability fits in breach and proximate cause is addressed
first, followed by an examination of foreseeability's role in duty.
Negligence law has dealt with the proximity that limits outcome-
responsibility under the doctrinal heads of duty of care and proximate
cause (remoteness, as it is sometimes called). In both areas a test of
foreseeability has eventually won out .... [Tihe law has correctly
sensed that it is proximity-as-foreseeability that is particularly
relevant to reparation. The reason is that the existence of fault
depends itself on epistemic considerations, in the form of belief in or
actual or constructive knowledge of causal regularities, and this gives
rise to a natural continuity between fault and proximity-as-
foreseeability. Both the basis of and the limitations on outcome-
responsibility are determined by the sense of having made a
difference, and this is a complex phenomenon. But there is no doubt
that it is present where our actions set in motion a foreseeable train of
events that conforms to known or partially known causal regularities,
since this increases our sense that we could have had a measure of
control over the situation, or at least that some agent, perhaps an
idealized one, could have had some control. If action generally
produced outcomes that conformed to no specifiable regularities, so
that we could never or almost never predict what the result of an
action would be, then we would have no sense that agency was in any
way meaningful, either for ourselves or with respect to its "effects" on
others; there would be no sense of making a difference. It is the
possibility of control, which depends in turn on the existence of
knowable regularities, that creates meaning of both kinds.
Perry, supra note 38, at 505.
65. See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1671 (2007) (cogently explaining how splitting factual and proximate
causation in two yields five negligence elements).
66. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 38, at 925-32; Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1247 (2009). Indirectly, foreseeability is also implicated in factual causation,
which is tied to foreseeability through negligence (where it fundamentally
resides), see, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty,
Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1071, 1082-84 (2001), and in damages, which are the kind of consequences that
normally must be foreseen.
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A. Breach
For all of the reasons previously discussed, there is little dispute
that the foundational element of negligence-wrongdoing, breach of
duty, falling below a community behavioral norm-necessarily rests
first upon an actor's ability to contemplate, at least abstractly, the
possibility that his or her contemplated behavior may cause the type
of hazard to the type of person that actually does result. This is
foreseeability-nothing more, nothing less.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligent conduct as
"an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as
involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest
of another."67 This standard is explained as whether "a reasonable
man should have expected that" his conduct "might cause harm to
persons" like the plaintiff.6 8  While this standard of what a
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284(a) (1965); see also id. § 291
("Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a
risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the
risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of
the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.") The language of
section 284(a) of the original Restatement of Torts was identical to that of
section 284(a) of the Restatement (Second), except that the original Restatement
said "should realize" instead of "should recognize." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
284(a) (1934). Comment a to the original Restatement's version of this section
explains that a reasonable man would realize such a risk if he, "knowing so
much of the circumstances surrounding the actor at the time of his act as the
actor knows or should know, would realize the existence of the risk and its
unreasonable character." Id. § 284 cmt. a. An actor "should recognize that his
conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of another's interest" if an actor,
having the perception, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment of a reasonable
man, or the higher perception and knowledge actually possessed by the actor,
"would infer that the act creates an appreciable chance of causing such
invasion." Id. § 289; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965)
(rephrasing these same principles); id. § 290 (describing what an actor is
required to know "[tor the purpose of determining whether the actor should
recognize that his conduct involves a risk," and including such items as the
normal characteristics of humans, animals, and things, commonly understood
forces of nature, and relevant laws and customs).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c, illus. 2 (1965); see also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1934) (containing the same
language). These illustrations in the original Restatement and the Restatement
(Second) restate the hypothetical propounded by Judge Andrews in Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104-05 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting), which addresses the responsibility of a driver ("chauffeur") who
injures various people in an explosion when he carelessly collides with another
car that contains dynamite, which nothing in the car's appearance would
suggest. Contrary to Judge Andrews, who would extend the chauffeur's liability
to all the victims directly and immediately injured, with only a passing nod to
(retrospective) foreseeability, the original Restatement and the Restatement
(Second) state that responsibility depends on whether a reasonable person in
the defendant's position "should have expected" the particular risk. Compare
id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c, illus. 2 (1965), and
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1934).
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reasonable man should recognize or expect embraces the idea of
foreseeable risk, the Restatement (Third) locates foreseeability more
prominently at the heart of negligence, defining negligence in
section 3 explicitly in terms of foreseeable risk:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors
to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any
harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.69
By defining both components of risk in terms of foreseeability,7' the
Restatement (Third)'s definition of negligence improves upon the
Restatement (Second)'s less explicit inclusion of foreseeability in
terms of what a reasonable man should recognize.
An important aspect of foreseeability's role in breach is how
widely foreseeability should be conceived. Focusing on the actor's
choice to act in a certain way that foreseeably produces a panoply of
risks to various persons, the Restatement (Third) properly evaluates
the broad bundle of hazards foreseeably flowing from an actor's
conduct: "[A]ll the risks foreseeably resulting from the actor's
conduct are considered in ascertaining whether the actor has
exercised reasonable care."7' As noted earlier, foreseeability
includes risks that an actor may not know but reasonably should,
commonly explained in constructive-knowledge terms as risks the
actor "should have known," meaning that prudence sometimes
requires actors to investigate and evaluate possibilities of hidden or
inchoate risk.72 In such cases, "the relevant burden of precautions is
the burden the actor would have borne by paying more attention in
the course of his ordinary affairs.7 3 Most agree that negligence
should be formulated in objective terms of constructive knowledge,74
69. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
70. The "burden of precautions" may be better modified by "expected,"
rather than "foreseeable." Though section 3 leaves this concept unmodified,
"expected" may be implied.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
72. Often, as a comment to section 3 observes, "the actor's alleged
negligence consists of an inattentive failure to perceive or appreciate the risk
involved in the actor's conduct." Id. § 3 cmt. k; see also id. § 3 cmt. g (discussing
situations in which "what is foreseeable concerns what the actor 'should have
known'").
73. Id. § 3 cmt. k.
74. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 38, at 506 n.207 ("Blame is assignable not
just where the agent acts with knowledge of fairly specific facts, say that a
certain action will or might cause a certain harm. It is also assignable where
the agent knows that he ought not to act without first obtaining knowledge of
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and the more perplexing problems of foreseeability that lurk in
breach are more directly bound up in proximate cause, where the
inquiry now will turn.
B. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause addresses the question of whether in fairness
and policy an actor should be held accountable in tort for a person's
harm that in some manner is "remote" from the actor's breach of
duty.'5 This doctrine serves to limit a tortfeasor's responsibility to
the consequences of risks viewed fairly as arising from the wrong.
Because "[i]t is always to be determined on the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy,
and precedent, 7 6 proximate cause is an "elusive butterfly"77 that e'er
evades a net of rules.78
Because proximate cause in truth is little more than a swirling
maelstrom of policy, practicality, and case-specific fairness
considerations-rather than a meaningful set of rules or even
principles-it would seem incapable of being subjected to rational
"testing." Yet, lawyers, courts, and juries continue to search for
guidance in unraveling the mysteries of this perplexing doctrine,
which has led courts and commentators on an eternal search for a
proper test for deciding whether a plaintiffs injury in any particular
case was a "proximate" result of the defendant's wrong. Over time,
courts have applied a number of tests that still sometimes inform
judicial decisions, at least to some extent. Today, as has been true
for many years, 9 the concept of "foreseeability," in one formulation
or another, is the "touchstone" ° or "cornerstone"8 1 of proximate
the specific facts (knows that he ought to know, for short).").
75. "It takes, perhaps, a degree of temerity to approach the subject of
Proximate Causation about which much has been written with apparently
increasing divergence of views." James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause,
39 HARv. L. REV. 149, 149 (1925). See generally JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS:
PROXIMATE CAUSE (2003) (providing a summary of proximate-cause doctrine and
its evolution). The following discussion is an expanded version of Owen, supra
note 65, at 1681-83.
76. 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110
(1906).
77. Accordini v. Sec. Cent., Inc., 320 S.E.2d 713, 714 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
78. "'Proximate cause' cannot be reduced to absolute rules." PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 42, at 279.
79. "Except only the defendant's intention to produce a given result, no
other consideration so affects our feeling that it is or is not just to hold him for
the result as its foreseeability; and no other consideration so largely influences
the courts." Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause (pt. 2), 72 U. PA. L. REV. 343, 352
(1924); see also HART & HONORE, supra note 6, at 254 ("A reading of many cases
on 'proximate cause' or 'remoteness of damage' leaves on the mind a strong
impression of the number and variety of references to foreseeability to be found
in judgments, even when they professedly treat of causal problems.").
80. See, e.g., Walcott v. Total Petrol., Inc., 964 P.2d 609, 611 (Colo. App.
1998) ("[F]oreseeability is the touchstone of proximate cause."); Jamison v. Ford
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cause.82  Proximate cause thus provides an outer boundary of
tortious responsibility that protects actors from liability for
consequences falling outside the scope of their wrongdoing, beyond
their moral accountability. As previously discussed, responsibility
for consequences should be based on the quality of an actor's choices,
and the moral fiber of those decisions is gauged by the consequences
the actor should contemplate as causal possibilities at the time the
choice is made. If some other, "unforeseeable" consequence
eventuates from an action, the fact that it lies outside the bundle of
consequences the actor reasonably should have contemplated means
that it probably did not inform the actor's deliberations and choice,
and thus that the consequence did not reflect his will. Under this
view of human agency, there is no moral connection between a
person's actions and the unforeseeable consequences of those
actions. This suggests, as concluded earlier, that only the
foreseeable consequences of an actor's choices may fairly be
considered in evaluating the moral quality of a choice, which is why
proximate cause limits negligence responsibility to the scope of risks
that are foreseeable.
83
Foreseeability may be even more important to proximate cause,
where it provides the central limiting consideration, than it is to
breach, where a number of important notions combine importantly
within the calculus. As a matter of corrective justice, tort law
appropriately holds blameworthy actors accountable only for harms
that they reasonably should contemplate as possible consequences of
the wrongful aspect of their conduct. Put otherwise, wrongdoers are
properly held liable only for harm foreseeably caused by their
wrongdoing, not for all the harms their actions may cause. A careful
driver, for example, who runs over a pedestrian, even if the driver is
in the process of kidnapping a child, is not subject to tort liability for
the pedestrian's harm." The Restatement (Third) captures this
Motor Co., 644 S.E.2d 755, 765 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) ("The touchstone of
proximate cause.., is foreseeability.").
81. See, e.g., Morguson v. 3M Co., 857 So. 2d 796, 800 (Ala. 2003) ("The
cornerstone of proximate cause is foreseeability.").
82. The classic "modern" cases highlighting the role of foreseeability in
duty and proximate cause, of course, are Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), and Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Engineering Co. (The Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from N.S.W.) (U.K.).
83. See The Wagon Mound No. 1, [1961] A.C. at 422-23 (observing that
"current ideas of justice or morality" argue for defining the scope of liability for
the consequences of a person's negligent actions in terms of the foreseeability of
those consequences and concluding that "[t]o demand more of him is too harsh a
rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilised order requires the observance of a
minimum standard of behaviour"); see also Owen, supra note 28, at 226-27.
84. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
117-21 (1997); Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52
HARv. L. REV. 372, 386 (1939).
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simple yet powerful idea in its principal section on proximate cause,
section 29 (Limitations on Liability for Tortious Conduct): "An
actor's liability is limited to those physical harms that result from
the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious." The Reporters
explain that this limitation, often termed the "scope of the risk"
approach, which they call the "risk standard,"86 is based on "the idea
that an actor should be held liable only for harm that was among
the potential harms-the risks-that made the actor's conduct
tortious."87
Several aspects of this definition of proximate cause pertain to
the foreseeability inquiry here. Plainly, the definition contains no
explicit mention of "foreseeability" or "foreseeable risk" and, indeed,
seems designed to shift attention away from the concept of
foreseeability to the concept of scope of risk. Foreseeability, of
course, is embedded in section 29's tortious-risk idea, since
negligence in section 3 is based on "the foreseeable likelihood that
the person's conduct will result in harm [and] the foreseeable
severity of any harm that may ensue."88 In fact, foreseeability
logically remains the primary consideration in scope of risk, and the
Reporters note an increasing movement toward foreseeability as the
"test for scope of liability in negligence cases."8 9 Thus, what "scope
of risk" in section 29 really means is scope of foreseeable risk.90
Indeed, this must be true, since foreseeability is the most salient
outer boundary defining the "scope" of moral responsibility for risks
of harm, as previously discussed. Yet this equivalence (or near
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
86. Id. § 29 cmt. d.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 3; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also id. § 29 cmt. j (discussing the
relationship between the "risk standard" and the "foreseeability standard").
90. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 187, at 463 (2000) (observing
that "foreseeability is a short hand expression intended to say that the scope of
the defendant's liability is determined by the scope of the risk he negligently
created"); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 43, at 297
(noting that "the 'scope of the foreseeable risk' is on its way to ultimate victory
as the criterion of what is 'proximate,' if it has not already achieved it"); id. § 43,
at 281 & n.6 (tracing the idea that foreseeability and scope of risk are
equivalent, in limiting responsibility, to two opinions written by Baron Pollock
in 1850); supra note 3. "Risk" and the risk theory can be (and frequently are)
viewed narrowly as including only risks that made the conduct negligent. In
addition to section 29 of the Restatement (Third), many commentators have long
espoused this view. See sources cited infra note 93. Yet risk theory may be
defined more broadly and inclusively. "In its looser form it invites the judge to
consider, when responsibility for harm is in dispute, on which of the parties the
risk of that harm should fall." HART & HONOR8, supra note 6, at 285 (explaining
that such a conception can embrace whatever principles a decision maker might
wish, such as economic efficiency).
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equivalence) of foreseeability and scope of risk lies muted in the
comments and Reporters' Notes. So, while the most vital concept in
section 29's scope-of-risk idea is foreseeability of the risk, this
foundational criterion remains hidden from open, black-letter view.
Foreseeability's burial deep inside the Restatement (Third)'s
formulation of proximate cause (itself buried under the label "Scope
of Liability"9' ) was no mistake. The Reporters, while acknowledging
that the two concepts are largely coextensive and suffer from the
same frailties of overbreadth, underbreadth, and indeterminacy,
nevertheless conclude that the risk theory's "simplicity," "more
refined analytical" basis, and flexibility justify substituting it for
simple foreseeability. 92 They are not alone. Warren Seavey and
many others have also seen great power, understandably, in the risk
approach popularized by Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf.93  The
Restatement (Second), in a comment entitled "Flexibility of risk,"
adopts the risk standard for the purpose of capturing within the
scope of risk all hazards and consequences that might be seen as
"normal and ordinary," though not "which a reasonable man would
have in contemplation and take into account in planning his
conduct"-such as the risk that negligent driving will endanger the
rescuer of a child endangered by the driving; or that a victim of the
negligent driving may "suffer further injury from negligent medical
treatment, or from a fall while attempting to walk on crutches; or
that the injured man may be left lying in the highway, where a
second car will run over him."94 To this list, one might add the risk
that the victim will suffer unexpectedly severe injuries due to a
particularly thin skull.95 Although these hazards are not the types
of hazards upon which actors normally dwell while acting,96 the
91. See Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of
Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 981 (2001) (recommending
this usage).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSIcAL HARM § 29 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
93. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 90-100(1963) (explaining that the risk rule had become the prevalent approach and
was preferable to the direct-consequences test); Seavey, supra note 84, at 391
(praising "the simplicity, logic, and justice" of Cardozo's risk approach in
Palsgraf); Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REV. 72, 90-93
(1942). Viscount Simonds, in Wagon Mound, emphasized that notions of
"justice or morality" argue for defining the scope of consequences for negligence
liability in terms of foreseeable risk. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Eng'g Co. (The Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388, 422 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from N.S.W.) (U.K.).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. g (1965); see also id. § 281
cmts. e-f (providing further discussion of how to define the scope of risk).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 31(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The Restatement (Third) addresses
responsibility for injuries to rescuers in section 32 and for enhanced harm from
efforts to render medical aid in section 35.
96. See Francis H. Bohlen, Book Review, 47 HARv. L. REV. 556, 557-58
1296 [Vol. 44
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Restatement (Second) reasons, they all are a "normal" consequence
of negligent driving and so fairly are included "within its scope."97
Risk theory, perhaps, is amenable to being stretched to capture
"ulterior risks" like these.98 But to argue that the concept of scope of
risk is flexible enough to capture ulterior risks, those that extend
beyond the kinds of risks people actually might think about at the
time of acting, while foreseeability is not, is to attribute too much
power to the risk standard and too little to foreseeability. First, we
should not forget that the risks rendering the conduct wrongful are
the bundle of hazards that foreseeably might result from the
conduct. 99 So, the flexibility of scope of risk and foreseeability would
seem identical, rendering either standard equally capable (or
incapable) of capturing whatever risks are fairly subject to capture.
Moreover, the Restatement (Second)'s narrow formulation of
foreseeability in terms of what a reasonable person truly might
contemplate in planning conduct ignores the broader kind of
reflective foreseeability that many courts intuitively apply in
widening the scope of consequences under the reasonably
foreseeable umbrella. While this broader, more abstract form of
"foreseeability" may be criticized for being outside the range of what
ordinary people actually think about when acting, 00 it reflects the
kind of objective-fairness perspective that embraces the reciprocal
(1934) (arguing that applying foreseeability to such risks "strain[s] the idea of
foreseeability past the breaking point").
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. g (1965).
None of these possibilities is in itself sufficient to make the driver
negligent, and none of them is sufficiently probable to influence the
conduct of a reasonable man in his position, which will be determined
without regard to them. Nevertheless, each of them is a normal, not
unusual consequence of the hazardous situation risked by the driver's
conduct, and each is justly attachable to the risk created, and so
within its scope.
In determining whether such events are within the risk, the
courts have been compelled of necessity to resort to hindsight rather
than foresight. If an event appears to have been normal, not unusual,
and closely related to the danger created by the actor's original
conduct, it is regarded as within the scope of the risk even though,
strictly speaking, it would not have been expected by a reasonable
man in the actor's place.
Id.
98. See HART & HONORS,, supra note 6, at 263-65 (characterizing as
'ulterior" that "harm the risk of which was not a reason for calling defendant's
act negligent," including harm to rescuers and negligent medical treatment
after an accident, and observing that neither the foreseeability doctrine nor the
risk doctrine plausibly includes such risks of harm).
99. See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 611 (1st Cir. 1955) (Magruder,
C.J.) (examining the proximate-cause problem in terms of the "bundle of risks"
one should contemplate from a particular type of accident).
100. See HART & HONORS, supra note 6, at 263 ("Reasonable foresight, in
relation to culpability, is therefore a practical notion .. ").
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nature of a tortious wrong, as previously discussed.'' These points
reveal the largely (if not precisely) equivalent work done by risk and
foreseeability in proximate cause, as judicial decisions increasingly
appear to recognize, 10 2 and argue not for finely spun dissertations on
why one is preferable to the other but for recognition that the two
approaches are better collapsed into a single standard of reasonably
foreseeable scope of risk."10
The discussion thus far has concerned foreseeable risk and
scope of risk, although the question of foreseeability in proximate
cause is often put in terms of the foreseeability of the consequences.
It commonly is said that responsibility requires only that an actor
foresee the type of harm,"0 not the manner of harm 5 nor the extent
of harm.' 6 Of interest here is the infelicitous convention in the first
usage-type of harm-of characterizing as '%arm" what usually is
meant as "hazard" (or "risk"),' an unhappy misnomer that also
recurs too frequently in connection with statutory violations and
negligence per se.'0 8 The usage problem with the "risk of harm"
expression concerns how narrowly or broadly "harm" is
characterized' 09-since "type of harm" in the proximate-cause
context is often really shorthand for "type of risk of harm," meaning
type of hazard. Yet, mischievously, the "type of harm" phraseology
is too easily (and hence too often) misinterpreted narrowly to mean
the type of damage to person or property. So, if an actor negligently
hands a loaded shotgun to his friend's 10-year-old daughter who
drops it on her toe, which is broken by the falling gun, the broken
toe fairly might be seen to lie outside the scope of foreseeable risk of
handing a loaded shotgun to a child.110 Yet the type of "harm" risked
by the negligence was personal injury, the type of harm that
actually occurred. The draft Restatement (Third) sensitively
examines this problem of how expansively to characterize the type of
101. See supra notes 30-31, 61-62 and accompanying text.
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYsIcAL HARM § 29 cmt.
e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
103. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt.
i (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (addressing levels of generality in
conceiving "type of harm").
105. See id. § 29 cmt. o (addressing "manner of harm").
106. See id. § 29 cmt. p (addressing "extent of harm").
107. See id. § 29 cmt. i (addressing "type of harm").
108. See id. § 29 cmt. k ("The risk standard in this Section is congruent as
well with scope-of-liability limitations employed for statutory violations that
constitute negligence per se. Liability for statutory violations is limited to
harms that the statute was enacted to prevent and to persons who were
intended to be protected from those harms.").
109. See id. § 29 cmt. i; see also id. § 29 cmt. h (alluding to "the problem of
the appropriate level of generality at which to define the harm").
110. See id. § 29 cmt. d, illus. 3.
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"harm,"11 but it ultimately leaves the resolution of this linguistically
seductive, interpretative problem to courts and juries without much
guidance." 2
One final concern about the Restatement (Third)'s decision to
define proximate cause in terms of scope of risk lies, ironically, in
the conceptual purity of that concept.1 3 Scope of (foreseeable) risk is
a simple, powerful theory, eloquently expounded by Judge Cardozo
in Palsgraf, that well resolves many remoteness issues.' Yet, its
simplicity suggests that this theory may circle back upon itself,
resulting in a kind of singularity that leaves insufficient power to
decide many cases.1 5 Even if the risk theory is as powerful as it
often is thought to be, this single concept may simply be inadequate
to the messy task assigned to proximate cause. As Judge Andrews
explained in his Palsgraf dissent, proximate cause might be seen as
embracing a less arid, more complex set of diverse considerations
than foreseeable risk-including such open-ended concepts as
fairness, justice, policy, practical politics, and common sense-that
cannot be corralled under any single conceptual umbrella, no matter
how pure or elegant it may be.1 6 Because the vast calculi of these
vague factors provide such an open-ended amalgam of
considerations, they are best applied to real-world disputes by juries
armed with an armada of fairness views, based on personal
experience and guided by flexible legal principles on how
responsibility boundaries fairly should be drawn on the unique facts
of every case. Foreseeability alone does no better in offering the
kind of rich reservoir of justice principles juries need to apply, and
no single concept can be offered as more than a useful, initial guide
for proximate-cause decisions.
If Holmes was right that the life of the law is not logic, but
experience, 1 7 then we should place our trust in jurors to put their
111. See id. § 29 cmts. h-i.
112. See id. § 29 cmt. i. Juries (and sometimes courts) often will need
specific guidance that type of harm usually really means type of hazard.
113. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 43, at 282 (referring
to the "pristine purity" of the risk rule).
114. Whether through the rubric of duty, per Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf,
or through the rubric of proximate cause, per the Restatement (Third).
115. See Stapleton, supra note 91, at 995 (arguing that the risk rule "is an
incoherent, or even circular, idea" through which tort law would "lose the
advantages of [its] separate analytical elements").
116. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103-05 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
117. HOLMES, supra note 58, at 1; see also AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS
90 (Gary L. Gregg II & Mark David Hall eds., 2008) ("Experience must be our
only guide. Reason may mislead us." (quoting John Dickinson, Speech at the
Constitutional Convention (Aug. 13, 1787))); MOSES COIT TYLER, PATRICK HENRY
124 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1887) ("I have but one lamp
by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no
way of judging of the future but by the past." (quoting Patrick Henry, Speech at
the Second Revolutionary Convention of Virginia (Mar. 23, 1775))).
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combined experience to work in deciding the fairness of connecting a
particular defendant's wrongdoing to a particular plaintiffs harm
that somehow is remote.118 As exquisite as may be the logical nexus
between wrongdoing and scope of risk, a conceptual equivalence that
may dazzle scholars with its elegant simplicity, we should not want
our street-level dispensers of justice chained like Prometheus to
scope of risk, foreseeability, or any other logical rock. Such lustrous
theories of proximate cause often help to point the way, but
individualized justice-much richer and more complex than any
logical theory-should be our goal. So, we should ask that jurors be
guided first and foremost by foreseeability and the scope of
(foreseeable) risk, but that they also be instructed, in working out
problems of proximate causation, to bring to bear their personal
toolboxes of factors comprising fairness, justice, practicality, and
119
common sense.
118. Professor Cardi explains this well: "The genius of the jury is that it
brings to each case multiple perspectives, both shared and diverse experiences,
and.., a legal tabula rasa. To put it simply-especially when considering a
question like foreseeability that is part-analysis, part-community experience,
and part-gestalt-perhaps twelve heads are better than one." W. Jonathan
Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739, 800 (2005).
119. This was also the view set forth in Edgerton, supra note 79, at 373,
which recommended that juries be instructed that a "legal" or proximate cause
"is a justly-attachable cause. A legal consequence of an act is an event which is
justly attributable to the act." Further:
"Just" means, not merely fair as between the parties, but socially
advantageous, as serving, directly and indirectly, the most important
of the competing individual and social interests involved. In deciding
whether it is just to attribute an unintended harmful event to a
particular act without which the harm would not have happened, you
may consider any circumstances which you think pertinent, but you
should not neglect the following considerations:
(a) The character of the act ....
(b) The risk of the harm ....
(c) Logical directness and intervening forces....
(d) Directness in time and space....
Id. at 373-75. Judge Andrews must have read Professor Edgerton's article
(published in 1924). Dean Prosser observed that "[tihe sole function of a rule of
limitation in these cases is to tell the court that it must not let the case go to the
jury. Yet we are in a realm where reasonable men do not agree." William L.
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1953). Concluding that we
have at best an "approach to the problem," Prosser doubted "that all the
manifold theories of the professors really have improved at all upon the old
words 'proximate' and 'remote,' with the idea they convey of some reasonable
connection between the original negligence and its consequences, between the
harm threatened and the harm done." Id. at 32. Prosser continued:
It has been, I think, always the formula, the generalization which has
been at fault, in a field where it seems impossible to generalize at all.
"The mule don't kick according to no rule." Direct causation, the scope
of the risk, the unforeseeable plaintiff, the last human wrongdoer, the
distinction between cause and condition, limitations of time and space,
1300 [Vol. 44
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C. Duty
Duty, the obligation of one person to another, is the thread that
binds humans to one another in community. Because negligence
law deems choices improper only if they breach a preexisting
obligation of repair for carelessly inflicted physical harm to another,
duty gives definitional coherence to the negligence inquiry. Serving
in this manner as the foundational element of a negligence claim,
duty provides the front door to recovery for the principal cause of
action in the law of torts. Every negligence claim must pass through
the duty portal that bounds the scope of tort recovery for accidental
harm. 120
In defining the maximum extent to which people are held
accountable for their damaging misdeeds in differing contexts, duty
balances the interests of certain classes of potential victims in
security from certain types of hazards and harm, on the one hand,
against the interests of certain classes of actors in freedom of action,
on the other. This balance of interests controls the extent to which
courts close the door on categories of problems at the edge of tort law
or instead pass such border problems through to juries for
determination. How strongly duty rules are framed controls the
extent to which negligence lawsuits of various types are approved
for full adjudication or are instead summarily ejected from the
judicial system. Weaker no-duty rules funnel more disputes at the
margin of negligence law into local courtrooms for possible redress,
while stronger no-duty rules force the victims of such disputes to
absorb their injuries themselves or seek relief from insurance
providers and other institutions beyond the courts.
Thus, the duty/no-duty element provides an important
screening function for excluding types of cases that are
inappropriate for negligence adjudication. Recurring categories of
cases where negligent conduct does not always give rise to liability,
where negligence claims may be barred or limited, include those
involving harm to third parties caused by certain types of actors,
substantial factors, natural and probable consequences, mechanical
systems of multiple rules, and all the rest of the rigmarole of
"proximate cause," all have been tried and found wanting in situations
that inevitably arise to which they do not and cannot provide a
satisfactory solution. There is no substitute for dealing with the
particular facts, and considering all the factors that bear on them,
interlocked as they must be.
Id.; see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 44, at 300
(expressing a similar view). With such skeptical ruminations, of course,
intelligent observers may disagree. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 93, at 25-26
(characterizing such skeptical attitudes as "non-rules"); id. at 48 ("[Tlhe leap
from insufficiency to futility is unjustified. Good legal rules are extremely
useful if depended upon to resolve those aspects of a legal problem to which
they are directed, and not more.").
120. This discussion is an expanded version of David Owen, Duty Rules, 54
VANi. L. REV. 767, 767-69, 773-74, 776-77 (2001).
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such as employers, manufacturers, professionals, probation officers,
and social hosts; 21 harm to unborn children;2 2 harm to trespassers
and others who enter another's property;12 ' harm from
"nonfeasance" (from failing to provide affirmative help to others in
need);' and damage to nonphysical interests, especially pure
economic loss and emotional harm.2 5 In contexts such as these,
while such harm may result from an actor's negligence, determining
whether recovery should be allowed under normal principles of
negligence law involves policy choices of the highest order for
deliberation by the courts, gatekeepers of the common-law
negligence system, as a threshold matter before appropriate
disputes are funneled into courtrooms for jury resolution.
Depending on the issue, duty determinations may call upon
every possible reason of fairness, justice, and social policy. In
assembling major considerations to be "balanced" in determining
duty or no duty, the California Supreme Court's list mirrors the lists
of many other courts:
[Tlhe foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved. 1
26
"Foreseeability," we see, conspicuously leads California's list,
just as it figures prominently among the duty factors drawn upon by
most other courts. 127 As Arthur Ripstein cogently declares, "Other
121. See, e.g., Homer v. Pabst Brewing Co., 806 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1986)
(employers); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974)(manufacturers); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 397(Ill. 1987) (professionals); Lamb v. Hopkins, 492 A.2d 1297, 1306 (Md. 1985)(probation officers); Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153, 158 (W. Va.
1990) (social hosts).
122. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906-07 (N.Y. 1969).
123. See, e.g., Wolf v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 697 A.2d 1082, 1086 (R.I.
1997).
124. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959).
125. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032(5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (pure economic loss); Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814,
830 (Cal. 1989) (emotional harm).
126. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968); see Dilan A. Esper
& Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 (2006) (arguing
that the proliferation of no-duty rulings in California in recent years reflects an
abuse of the duty concept).
127. See Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent
Consolidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the
New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO
1302 [Vol. 44
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factors may be relevant to the existence of a duty, but foreseeability
provides an outer bound beyond which there can be no liability
because there can be no duty."128 In the words of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, "Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the
foundational element in the determination of whether a duty
exists." 129 But the Restatement (Third), drawing upon the important
scholarship of Jonathan Cardi,130 has decided to rip foreseeability,
root and stock, from duty:
Despite frequent use of foreseeability in no-duty
determinations, this Restatement disapproves that practice
and limits no-duty rulings to articulated policy or principle in
order to facilitate more transparent explanations of the
reasons for a no-duty ruling and to protect the traditional
function of the jury as factfinder.1 31
This move, contrary to how most courts view duty, might be
seen as passing strange. Positing that foreseeability is relevant to
whether a defendant breached its duty of care1 32 and (at least
indirectly) to the scope of that duty under proximate cause'133-but
not to whether the defendant had a duty of care in the first place-
might be seen as putting the proverbial cart before the horse. 1
34
There are some arguments for kicking foreseeability out of duty,
tied to the Reporters' vision of the proper allocation of issues among
the elements of negligence. Foreseeability is a fact-specific concept,
it is argued, that properly is pertinent only to breach and proximate
L. REV. 1503, 1524 (1997) (conducting a fifty-state survey of duty and
concluding in part that "[floreseeability, as Cardozo, Prosser (Green) and the
California courts agree, has become prominent in questions of duty (and other
questions of liability)-however, foreseeability is not the only determinant of
liability"); Zipursky, supra note 66, at 1258 (concluding from a survey of states
that "almost every jurisdiction does treat foreseeability as a significant factor
(and frequently the most significant factor) in analyzing whether the duty
element is met in a negligence claim").
128. Ripstein, supra note 5, at 374. Professor Ripstein may have been
speaking loosely, in terms that some might characterize as addressing breach
rather than duty, yet his assertion appears more powerfully fundamental, in a
Cardozian kind of way.
129. J.S. v. R.T.H, 714 A.2d 924, 928 (N.J. 1998).
130. See Cardi, supra note 118; Cardi, supra note 38; W. Jonathan Cardi &
Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 (2008).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
132. See id. § 3.
133. See id. § 29 cmt. j.
134. For a cart-before-the-horse case, see Illidge v. Goodwin, (1831) 5 Car. &
P. 190, 172 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P.), in which the defendant left his cart and horse
in the street unattended, whereupon a third person startled the horse, causing
it to back the cart through the plaintiffs china-shop window. The court
remarked that, remote harm or not, "[i]f a man chooses to leave a cart standing
in the street, he must take the risk of any mischief that may be done." Id. at
192, 172 Eng. Rep. at 935.
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cause, determinations grounded fundamentally in the facts of
particular cases." 5 Hence, the reasoning seems to go, fact-intensive
considerations are incompatible with the work of duty, which is to
render law-intensive policy decisions that span entire categories of
types of defendants, types of plaintiffs, types of hazards, and types
of harms. A related argument is that courts should make no-
liability decisions, in cases where the facts so demand, only by
ruling on other elements as a matter of law, specifically on breach
and proximate cause. 13 6 While it certainly is true that courts should
not hide liability or proximate-cause decisions under a duty mantle,
this is a weak argument for ejecting foreseeability from duty. As
broad-based rules of law, duty (and no-duty) rulings by courts
contain much more intrinsic power than do breach and proximate-
cause rulings, for duty rulings far more prominently telegraph rules
across the legal landscape that help lawyers and their clients
understand the law. 137  Since pure duty/no-duty rulings are
exceptional, 138 they deserve the widespread dissemination they
receive, and converting important rulings of this type to case-specific
breach and proximate-cause decisions drains them of their power to
effectively communicate important information on the scope of law
throughout the legal world. Thus, an initial response to the wrong-
element argument is that we might be better served by more
duty/no-duty rulings, not less.
The improper-element argument for booting foreseeability from
duty suffers from a false premise: that foreseeability inherently is so
fact-specific that it cannot operate at a categorical level. When
courts address foreseeability in duty determinations, they are using
a different, broader type of foreseeability than that employed in
breach and proximate-cause determinations made on facts of
particular cases. 139 In the duty context, courts draw lines between
types of parties and types of wrongful conduct threatening types of
hazards and types of harm. For a court to imagine how the scope of
liability for negligence might look under one type of duty rule
contrasted to how it might look under a duty rule of a different
formulation, the court must consider the reach of negligence under
135. See Cardi, supra note 118, at 801-04.
136. See id. at 774-78.
137. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1831-32 (1998).
138. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: LiAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7(b)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
139. At least Professors Goldberg and Zipursky appreciate the difference
between categorical and particularized foreseeability. See John C.P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in
Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 727-28 (2001), an article elegantly
addressed in Owen, supra note 120. Professors Cardi and Green disagree. See
Cardi & Green, supra note 130, at 722 (arguing "that foreseeability is
inherently unamenable to categorical decisionmaking, and that foreseeability is
not in fact decided categorically by courts").
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both formulations of the rule. Yet, as previously discussed, the
reach of negligence is foreseeable risk. It seems artificial, sterile,
unrealistic, illogical, and bizarre to argue that judges should be
deprived of a conceptual tool that lies at the center of moral and
legal responsibility for negligence, the reach of which judges must
define. At the root of all duty issues is the question of whether, as a
general principle, certain types of actors should or should not be
subject to the law of negligence for causing certain types of hazards
that threaten certain types of harm to certain types of victims. It is
hard to understand why we would demand that judges, in the
process of making these important categorical decisions on the scope
of responsibility for wrongdoing, exclude from their judicial
consideration the possibility that reasonable people in these
situations should contemplate the types of risk for which they may
be held responsible. If using foreseeability in this categorical
manner appears to offer judges, when peering down from Mount
Olympus, a word or concept they should not use for resolving
problems affecting only mortals in the valley below, then we might
call the notion something else when put to judicial use-perhaps
"categorical foreseeability" or "judicial foreseeability" would do the
trick.
Another improper-element rationale for banishing foreseeability
from duty lies in the age-old judge/jury debate. It is hornbook law,
of course, that duty is a question of law for courts, whereas breach
and proximate cause are questions of fact for juries. Including
foreseeability (or foreseeable scope of risk) in duty enriches this
important, threshold element of negligence by offering judges an
important conceptual tool they may use to keep inappropriate cases
from ever reaching juries.4 0 This hoary battle in American law over
the allocation of power between judge and jury lay at the heart of
the Cardozo/Andrews divide in Palsgraf, and it is a battle that will
continue until the cows come home.1 4 ' But the judge/jury battle is
unlikely to be much affected by a restatement's exclusion of an
important duty factor from the calculus of considerations where
most courts believe it properly belongs.
Another argument for kicking foreseeability out of duty-the
transparency or "lazy-judge" rationale-is that courts hide under it
too easily to cover policy choices that should instead be forced out
into the bright light of day. 4 2  It is no doubt true that
140. See generally KEETON, supra note 93, at 99-100 (concluding that judges
should deliberately address "the allocation of judicial and jury responsibility"
for scope-of-risk decisions rather than ruling rigidly that this issue is by nature
one of duty or proximate cause that simply belongs in its respective domain);
Kelley, supra note 18, at 1061-63 (explaining that proximate-cause issues, as
well as duty issues, are often appropriately decided by courts).
141. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 38, at 921-24.
142. See Cardi, supra note 118, at 762-67; Cardi, supra note 38, at 983-86;
supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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"foreseeability" indeed is a tempting cover (we might say "tent")
beneath which courts may hide their rationales. Take an example:
Pup-tent manufacturers, we might posit, should not be responsible
for the harm caused by a scout leader who hides inside a tent to
molest a scout. 4 1 If a court agrees with our view that tent
manufacturers should not bear the burden of this type of use of their
product, it might well simply declare no duty because the risk is
"unforeseeable." To this, commentators might complain that such a
judge is being lazy or otherwise irresponsible for not transparently
revealing the true reasons for holding as it does.
The first response to the lazy-judge critique is that
"unforeseeable" in fact probably does a pretty good job of describing
an important reason why tent manufacturers fairly might be
protected from this type of risk. Another response to the lazy-judge
rationale is to note its arrogance in assuming that commentators
know what should and should not be shielded from public view,
whereas judges do not. That judges are overworked is no secret, and
to provide them with a flexible concept that facilitates explanation,
even if it short-circuits it somewhat, may often provide more benefit
than cost. It simply is not reasonable to demand that judges always
fully explain all aspects of their rulings. Some duty conclusions are
very difficult to explain, resting on a complex calculus of social,
moral, and practical policies, a full explanation of which may well
extend beyond the time constraints, expressive abilities, and even
consciousness of almost any hardworking judge. Moreover, we
should not think that lazy judges are the same as stupid judges, of
whom there are surely few. Any busy judge worth his or her salt,
working feverishly late at night to justify a no-duty ruling, who is
deprived of his or her "lazy-judge" foreseeability prong on which to
hang a hat, has only to move the hat to a "fairness" prong, or to one
called "justice," or to the familiar prong called "social policy." And
conclusory labels like these, one might opine, are even more opaque
than foreseeability, which possesses substantive meaning, grounded
ultimately in human will.
In conclusion, excluding foreseeability from duty appears to be
not only contrary to the case law but a policy mistake as well. It
seems illogical, if not downright immoral, to demand that courts
design and apply rules defining the scope of responsibility for
human wrongdoing divorced from one of wrongdoing's most
important moral tethers-foreseeability.
IV. REFIGURING FORESEEABILITY
Like celestial dark matter, foreseeability swirls throughout the
law of tort, permeating, connecting, and providing moral strength to
the elements of negligence. Since responsibility for harm is rooted
143. For an analogous situation, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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in the human will, manifested by an actor's choices to act in ways
that may cause harm to others, the ability of individuals to
recognize the possibility that their contemplated actions may be
harmful is fundamental to responsibility in tort as well as morals.
Just how foreseeability should figure in negligence law-how
foreseeability should be distributed among the various elements of
negligence-raises important questions addressed by the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, which has been underway for a decade
and is near completion. How the Restatement (Third) refigures
foreseeability for the next generation of lawyers raises important
questions examined here.
No one should doubt that foreseeability is an explicit, central
consideration in evaluating whether a person's conduct should be
blamed-whether it is "negligent." The draft Restatement (Third)
saliently makes this point, raising foreseeability to central, black-
letter status in its definition of negligence. While foreseeability also
plays a prominent role in proximate cause, in helping to define the
scope of a wrongdoer's responsibility for harmful consequences, the
Restatement (Third) opts instead for a pristinely pure "scope of risk"
approach that mutes foreseeability and highlights other analytics.
Most courts also locate foreseeability in duty, the threshold element
of negligence law, but the draft Restatement (Third) boldly banishes
foreseeability from this domain. Reflecting the age-old power
struggle between judge and jury, the Restatement (Third)'s ejection
of foreseeability from the forum where courts make rules of law on
responsibility for harm raises serious questions about how we expect
judges to make important decisions about the reach of tort law if
they are deprived of one of tort's foundational moral anchors.
Oddly narrowing the decisional power of both judge and jury in
the realms where their respective expertise is needed most, the draft
Restatement (Third) allocates foreseeability and scope of risk
between proximate cause and duty in a fashion that seems almost
backwards and contrary to some of Palsgrafs most important
lessons. By stripping duty of foreseeability, one of duty's key
features, the Restatement (Third) discards Judge Cardozo's
elemental work in Palsgraf so long ago. And, by harnessing juries to
a sterile yoke of scope of risk for proximate-cause decisionmaking,
the draft Restatement (Third) also rejects Judge Andrew's valuable
insight that juries should be offered a wide range of fairness factors,
beginning with foreseeability, in figuring how far responsibility
should extend. Be that as it may, foreseeability was the moral glue
of negligence before tort law was first restated many years ago, and,
regardless of its reconfiguration in the Restatement (Third),
foreseeability will continue, at least on earth, to ground and bind the
elements of negligence law together.
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